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In “Are Conciliatory Views of Disagreement Self-Defeating?” I argued that we should 
revise how we understand conciliatory views of disagreement. Conciliatory views of 
disagreement claim that discovering that an epistemic peer disagrees with you is 
epistemically significant. In particular, they have been understood as claiming that 
becoming aware that an epistemic peer disagrees with you about a proposition makes you 
less justified in adopting the doxastic attitude that you had toward that proposition. So, if 
you believed p and became aware that your epistemic peer disbelieves p, then you would 
become less justified in believing p, at least so long as you have no undefeated reason to 
discount your peer’s conclusion about p. More formally, conciliationism has been 
understood as claiming the following: 
 
(CV): If (i) at t S1 is justified in adopting doxastic attitude D1 toward 
proposition p and (ii) at a later time t’ S1 becomes justified in believing 
that an epistemic peer S2 has adopted a competitor doxastic attitude D2 
toward p, and (iii) at t’ S1 has no undefeated reason to discount S2’s 
conclusion; then at t’ S1 becomes less justified in adopting D1 toward p. 
 
I argued that conciliatory views of disagreement should be understood as making the 
following more modest claim: 
 
(CV*): If (i) at t S1 is justified in adopting doxastic attitude D1 toward 
proposition p and (ii) at a later time t’ S1 becomes justified in believing 
that an epistemic peer S2 has adopted a competitor doxastic attitude D2 
toward p; then at t’ S1 gains a defeater for adopting D1 toward p. 
 
CV*, like CV, claims that peer disagreement is epistemically significant—both claim that 
in becoming aware that a peer disagrees you gain a reason to become less justified in 
your doxastic attitude toward the disputed proposition. However CV* differs from CV in 
one important way. CV*, unlike CV, makes no claim about what the subject is on balance 
justified in believing (or to what degree) at t’; it makes no claim about what the net effect 
of this reason gained via the disagreement is. While gaining a defeater for adopting a 
doxastic attitude toward a proposition may result in the subject becoming less on balance 
justified in adopting that attitude toward that proposition it needn’t. Defeaters can 
themselves be defeated—there are defeater-defeaters—and CV does not adequately 
account for this. Condition (iii) in CV does rule out some potential defeater-defeaters—it 
rules out S1 having reasons to discount S2’s conclusion on the matter—however, there 
are other possible defeater-defeaters (one’s that are not reasons to believe that the peer’s 
conclusion is mistaken).  
 
I. Motivation for the Change 
 
I argued that such a modification was an improvement for several reasons, but focused on 
how such a modification would help conciliatory views avoid problems with being self-
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defeating in offering inconsistent advice.1 In general, the modification is important since 
CV is simply too strong. CV claims that gaining one piece of evidence (in a particular 
circumstance) is sufficient to alter what one is on balance justified in believing (and to 
what degree). Such a claim is implausible on any epistemic framework, but my focus was 
on evidentialism. According to evidentialism: 
 
For any subject S, proposition P, time T, and doxastic attitude D, S is 
justified in adopting D toward P at T if and only if having D toward P fits 
the evidence S has at T. 
 
Evidentialists should reject CV in favor of CV*. Evidentialism tells you that what 
doxastic attitude you are justified in adopting toward a proposition (and to what degree) 
is a matter of your total evidence. CV claims that adding one piece of evidence (in a 
particular circumstance) will always have a certain on balance justificatory effect. 
Evidentialists should reject CV, since CV makes no mention of what other pieces of 
evidence the subject may possess before becoming aware of the disagreement. In certain 
situations, the subject may antecedently possess pieces of evidence that would mitigate, 
or even entirely neutralize, the justificatory effect of the evidence about the peer 
disagreement. 
 
Some examples will help. Suppose that at t, S1 is justified in believing that disagreement 
is without any epistemic significance—that finding out that a peer disagrees about p 
should make no difference to what you believe. If so, then it seems that learning that her 
peer disbelieves compatibilism about free will (while S1 believes it) will have no net 
justificatory effect on what S1 is justified in believing about compatibilism at t’, even if 
we suppose that a conciliatory views of disagreement is correct. Learning of the 
disagreement may give S1 a reason to not believe compatibilism at t’, but this reason is 
fully defeated by other evidence that S1 has (namely, her justified belief that 
disagreement is without epistemic significance). In this case, S1’s defeater-defeater is 
misleading, since disagreement is epistemically significant, but its being misleading does 
not prevent it from being a defeater. 
 
Alternatively, suppose that at t, S1 is justified in believing that rationality is quite 
permissive—that bodies of evidence can justify (and equally well) a number of different 
(and even incompatible) views. In particular, suppose that S1 is justified in believing that 
her body of evidence justifies both belief and suspension of judgment toward the 
proposition that compatibilism is true. If so, then it seems that learning that her peer 
disagrees with her about compatibilism (by suspending judgment about it) will have no 
net justificatory effect on what S1 is justified in believing about compatibilism at t’. 
Learning of the disagreement gives her a reason to not believe compatibilism at t’, but 
here again this reason is fully defeated by her other evidence (namely, her justified belief 
that on this matter the shared evidence justifies both believing and suspending about 
compatibilism, and that it justifies each of these doxastic attitudes equally well). 
 
                                            
1 For Littlejohn’s response to this charge see Littlejohn (2013) and (2014). 
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The general idea is that defeaters can themselves be defeated. So, even if peer 
disagreement is epistemically significant in that it provides you with a defeater for the 
doxastic attitude you have toward the disputed proposition, this is not sufficient for the 
defeater to have the net justificatory effect of reducing your on balance justification for 
adopting the doxastic attitude in question. It will matter what other evidence you have; it 
will matter whether you have a defeater-defeater. The defeater-defeaters mentioned here 
are importantly not reasons to discount your peer’s conclusion (they are not reasons to 
think your peer is mistaken or that your peer should not be trusted on this matter or this 
occasion), so clause (iii) of CV does not rule out these scenarios. As such, we have 
reason to abandon CV and adopt CV* in its place.  
 
Such a move also prevents conciliatory views from giving conflicting prescriptions. If the 
defeater gained from the discovery of the disagreement could not itself be defeated, then 
a conciliatory view could tell you directly to believe p, while telling you indirectly to not 
believe p (by telling you to believe a competitor view of disagreement which tells you to 
not to believe p). For instance, in our case above where the subject is justified in 
believing that disagreement is epistemically insignificant, we can suppose that our subject 
is justified in believing this because of what CV claims (in virtue of meeting the right 
kind of epistemic peers). In such a scenario, CV (directly) claims that S1 is less justified 
in believing compatibilism and CV (indirectly) claims that S1 is not less justified in 
believing compatibilism (by claiming that S1 should not believe CV but should believe 
that disagreement is epistemically insignificant). CV* avoids this problem by not making 
any proclamations about what S1’s total evidence supports at t’. It claims that S1 gains a 
particular sort of reason, but does not make any claims about how that reason fits in with 
the other reasons S1 has. Thus, the move to CV* from CV also avoids the self-defeat 
charge that has been leveled against conciliatory views. 
 
II. Evidentialism and Conciliatory Views 
 
While this discussion takes place against the backdrop of evidentialism, I think the same 
lessons apply with or without that assumption. For instance, we can suppose that 
reliabilism is correct (that a belief is justified just in case it is produced by a reliable 
belief-forming process). A reliabilist could still adopt a conciliatory view of disagreement 
and claim that in learning that a peer disagrees, one gets a defeater for one’s justification 
for adopting the relevant doxastic attitude toward the disputed proposition. However, like 
the evidentialist, the reliabilist should want to resist the claim that such a defeater always 
has a certain net justificatory effect. After all, the reliabilist too must account for the 
existence of defeater-defeaters, and must allow for the possibility that our subject possess 
one that mitigates, or even entirely neutralizes, the defeater gained from learning of the 
peer disagreement. So, regardless of which particular epistemic backdrop we assume, the 
move from CV to CV* is well motivated. 
 
III. Littlejohn’s Complaint 
 
Littlejohn claims that the problems I’m trying to solve aren’t problems with CV, but with 
the evidentialist framework I am working with. Thus, he claims that my proposed 
solution fails to get at the root of the issue. In fact, Littlejohn (2014) maintains that there 
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is no real problem here for CV since the objection requires incompatible assumptions 
(110).  
 
Here’s how Littlejohn (2014) frames the objection to CV: 
 
P1. Under a certain set of circumstances a set of principles that includes CV tells 
us to believe CV is false and believe that an epistemic norm (EN)2 that issues 
advice inconsistent with CV is true. 
 P2. If you rationally believe EN, then you must conform to EN. 
 P3. You rationally believe EN. 
 P4. You must conform to EN. 
 P5. If CV is correct, it is not true that you must conform to EN. 
 C. CV is incorrect (109). 
 
P1 is plausible since we can suppose that evidentialism is true and that your evidence 
supports believing CV is false and that EN (a competitor epistemic norm) is true. That’s 
one way that one’s evidence could be.  
 
P2 is a statement of what Littlejohn calls ‘the enkratic requirement’—a requirement to 
bring our first-order beliefs in line with our higher-order beliefs. Littlejohn claims that if 
the enkratic requirement is a requirement of rationality, then anyone who rationally 
believed EN would need to conform to EN as well 3 (109-10). 
 
P3 just stipulates that someone is in the set of circumstances laid out in P1. Since this set 
of circumstances is possible, it is possible that someone be in them. P4 follows from P2 
and P3. 
 
P5 is motivated by the idea that rationality does not require you to follow inconsistent 
advice. So if CV is correct, you should conform to it, not to its competitor EN. C follows 
from P4 and P5. 
 
Littlejohn claims that we should not be worried by this argument since evidentialism is 
inconsistent with the enkratic requirement. Since Littlejohn’s construction of the 
objection to CV was motivated by way of both evidentialism and the enkratic 
requirement, the objection utilized inconsistent motivation and we are thus left without 
reason to endorse the conclusion—all the reasons for endorsing the premises cannot be 
jointly true. 
 
The first thing to note here is that even if evidentialism and the enkratic requirement are 
inconsistent (we will examine that claim below) this would not give us a good reason to 
reject the above argument. While we can use evidentialism to motivate P1 and P3 we 
needn’t do so. P1 and P3 are plausible premises regardless of what one takes as the 
fundamental epistemic framework (evidentialism or some competitor). For instance, 
                                            
2 I have altered Littlejohn’s argument here to simply refer to a general competitor epistemic norm rather 
than the particular competitor Littlejohn references. 
3 Littlejohn also uses the enkratic requirement as a premise in a larger argument in Littlejohn (2012). 
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reliabilists will agree that under certain circumstances a set of principles that include CV 
will tell us to believe CV is false and believe that EN is true. The relevant set of 
circumstances that a reliabilist will cite as relevant will differ from the set of 
circumstances given by the evidentialist (or at least the salient features of those 
circumstances will differ), but there are many ways of endorsing P1 and P3 without 
endorsing evidentialism. The argument needn’t utilize evidentialism in motivating its 
premises. So, even if evidentialism is inconsistent with P2 we have not yet seen a 
problem for the argument. P1 and P3 are plausible prior to, and independent of, any 
commitments regarding what the fundamental epistemic norms are. 
 
Second, it is not clear that there is an inconsistency between evidentialism and the 
enkratic requirement. Why think that evidentialism is inconsistent with the enkratic 
requirement? Littlejohn notes that evidentialism could have it that one is required to 
disbelieve evidentialism and even to believe a competitor epistemic norm. In such 
circumstances, Littlejohn claims that the enkratic requirement has it that the subject must 
now conform to this competitor norm. However, if there are any cases where 
evidentialism does not hold (cases where you should conform to a competitor norm), then 
evidentialism is false. Thus, Littlejohn argues, evidentialism and the enkratic requirement 
are inconsistent principles. 
 
Is there a tension here? It depends upon how we understand the enkratic requirement. On 
some ways of unpacking the requirement it is inconsistent with evidentialism, but on 
other ways of unpacking the requirement it is not. In addition, the ways of unpacking the 
requirement that are inconsistent with evidentialism have it that the enkratic requirement 
is not a true requirement of rationality. So, the enkratic requirement is either true and 
consistent with evidentialism, or false and inconsistent with it. Let’s look at why. 
 
Let’s suppose that evidentialism is true. Let’s suppose further that Sue’s evidence is such 
that it supports disbelieving evidentialism and believing that reliabilism is true. Given the 
truth of evidentialism, Sue is rational or justified in believing reliabilism. What follows? 
Should she conform to reliabilism? Well, that depends upon what it means to conform to 
a norm. Should she follow the prescriptions of reliabilism? It doesn’t seem so. Consider 
two scenarios. First, suppose that Sue knows, or is justified in believing, that her belief 
that p is produced by a reliable belief-forming process. If so, then her total evidence 
supports that her belief that p is justified, even if she lacks direct evidence for p. After all, 
her total evidence supports reliabilism and that the reliabilist conditions for a justified 
belief are met in her belief that p. Sue has a simple valid argument for p and she is 
justified in believing both of the premises. 
 
  P1. I am justified in believing all beliefs with feature F. 
  P2. My belief B has feature F. 
  C. I am justified in having B. 
 
Having B puts Sue’s first-order beliefs in line with her higher-order beliefs. Since those 
higher-order beliefs are justified (by stipulation) and she is justified in making the 
connection between them and her first order belief B, Sue is also justified in having B. 
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Second, suppose that Sue forms a belief that q that is in fact formed by a reliable belief-
forming process, though she has no evidence of this fact nor does she have evidence that 
supports q directly. Should Sue believe q? No. Sue should believe reliabilism is true, but 
only because evidentialism is true and her evidence supports believing reliabilism. Being 
justified in believing reliabilism does not make reliabilism true, and it does not make any 
belief of Sue’s justified merely in virtue of being formed by a reliable belief forming 
process. It is only the true epistemic norms that matter, and by assumption evidentialism 
is true.4 Sue should follow her evidence—always (at least on the supposition that 
evidentialism is true). That evidence may lead her away from believing evidentialism, but 
it will never make her such that she should not believe in accordance with her evidence.  
 
At times, Littlejohn unpacks the enkratic requirement as the requirement to bring one’s 
first-order beliefs in line with one’s higher-order beliefs. This interpretation of the 
requirement seems correct. This interpretation provides one way of explaining why Sue is 
justified in believing p in the first scenario. However, this interpretation is by no means in 
conflict with evidentialism. In fact, certain views about higher-order evidence and its 
justificatory effects when coupled with evidentialism seem to entail it.5 
 
At other times (and in the argument itself) Littlejohn unpacks the enkratic requirement as 
the requirement to conform to/follow norms that you are justified in believing. On this 
interpretation, the enkratic requirement is in conflict with evidentialism. This is apparent 
in the second scenario envisioned above. However, on this interpretation, the enkratic 
requirement appears quite implausible. In fact, the motivation that Littlejohn gives for 
accepting the enkratic requirement only applies to the first interpretation, since it is 
concerned with aligning one’s first-order beliefs with one’s higher-order beliefs, so there 
appears to be little cost in denying the second interpretation.  
 
So, a good way out of the self-defeat objection as formulated by Littlejohn is to deny P2. 
P2 requires the second interpretation of the enkratic requirement and we have seen reason 
to believe that it is false. Moving from CV to CV* is consistent with this move, and 
respects the first interpretation of the enkratic requirement at the same time. Thus, the 
move from CV to CV* is an improvement for conciliatory views of disagreement. 
 
Contact details: jonathan.matheson@gmail.com 
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